: study, this article examines the 1 In early 1998 the rural Town of Katherine proposition that recent policy in the NT in the Northern Temtory was recovering has involved two quite different from a catastrophic flood. Both Commonsewerage and roads, and buying and / approaches. These policies are wealth and NT Government sources were renovating houses for distinguishable by the degree of providing emergency financial assistance communities. An estimated authoritarianism as distinct from self for Katherine residents and the NT determination that is afforded to Governmentwasassistingwiththeclean Aboriginal people in controlling their up. This was a situation of major living conditions. dislocation, as many residents were Northern Temtory Government and ATSIC This study considers a problem in without their usual housing and were data revealing about 90 per rent of houses 'Aboriginal living conditions' recently I sharing, living away from home or living owned or administered by indigenous experienced in the Northern Territory, in makeshift accommodation. It was a community housing organ-isations require and examines two responses to this , time of stress, a time of frayed sensitivities either signqicant repairs or replacement. problem. The case study begins to and a time when Katherine residents I f you try an experiment and it fails, you illustrate how divergent conceptual-needed the support and assistance that i have to try something different,' [ t h e Minister for Aboriginal Affairs, The Hon. John] Hewon says. (Toohey, 2000:26.) The clear implication within this article is that the government has experimented by allowing ~~~~h~~~ isations of Aboriginal living condition their elected representatives seemed to be problems can develop into inconsistent answers to those problems. It then considers the implications that problem 1 conceptualisation has for intervention and poses questions about the validity of Territory (NT) Indigenous communities the Commonwealth Government's to administer expensive essential services conceptualisation of Aboriginal living very willing to offer.
However this was also the time the NT Environmental Health Authority took action to clear both the 'Wallaby Camp' and the 'Red Gum Camp'. According to the long-term Manager of the Wardaman Aboriginal Corporation, Mick Peirce, yet an unacceptable proportion of the condition problems. Finally, it considers , Wallaby Camp had for some time been a houses provided are now dilapidated. It the policy implications congregating area and domestic space for suggests government generosity, in the For the purposes of this discussion a around 30 Aboriginal residents, and face of appalling Indigenous failure, along 'rational' view of policy is presumed. This similarly Red Gum Camp supported 5-10 with an alternative approach to essential holds that governments do not intervene residents (Peirce 1999) . The 'clearance' service management that does not involve i n social conditions on impulse and removed from these camps rubbish, all Indigenous control of resources. There is commonly intervention is something that infrastructure , and the 'swags' a n d i an obvious perception that there is a they avoid unless potential benefits are personal effects of residents. These were policy problem in managing Aboriginal perceived to be greater than possible collected and dumped (Campbell 1999) . living conditions. i costs. The intervention process is The sites were graded, furrowed and Clearly the Commonwealth Govern-assumed to seek the most efficient and ment recognises 'homelessness and effective solution to the perceived overcrowding' i n the NT Aboriginal problem. However the following case posted with 'no-camping' signage. Though there had been a widely represented community group working on the issue community as a problem that is not satisfactorily responding to policy solutions. Yet if one is to consider the I current policy as experimental and a 1 A brief examination of this recent study highlights the potential for of these camps, there was scant outcry competing and conflicting perceptions of except from Aboriginal groups after this a policy problem to lead to different action was taken (Peirce 1999 A resulting Memorandum of Understanding formalized arrangements for dealing with 'Aboriginal Accommodation and Related Problems', as it was accepted that some Aboriginal residents of the Katherine area had significant alcohol-related behavioural problems. This was a significant issue i n the Katherine community. The Memorandum recognized 'That an improved quality of life for all members of the community [was] best achieved through a cooperative approach by all parties concerned' (KTC 1995) . This consultative and planned approach strategically dealt with Aboriginal living condition problems through distinct housing and social behaviour strategies (KTC 1995 
I
There was also a persistent perception of social behaviour problems in these towns.
The major division between the Wardaman Corporation and government views, as evidenced in minutes of the KALA working party, centered on the issue of offensive behaviours in public. The Katherine Town Council was concerned about potential influxes of illegal campers who would participate in these behaviours and would worsen the problem in Katherine (KTC 1995; Hatton I 1999) . To the Katherine Town Council, the Wallaby and Red Gum camps were a source of persistent behavioural problems which they had to address (KTC 1995 , Hatton 1999 . From their perspective, the camps were drinking sites and the campers were a source of offensive behaviour associated with public drunkenness.
As these camping areas were not gazetted for Aboriginal living, they were not bona fide Aboriginal Communities and therefore the 'campers' had no right to be living there. From this perspective the residents were illegal campers who chose this lifestyle rather than the strictures of Aboriginal laws in Aboriginal Communities (Hatton 1999). Other accommodation was available to them through Aboriginal Hostels Limited and the Department of Housing if desired and if they were prepared for a brief period on a waiting list. Yet these apparent lifestyle problems seemed to be caused by deliberate choice and the Minister, as the legal owner of the public space, had every right to move the campers out and clear the land (Dalrymple 1996) .
As the KALA working party's commissioned reports were firmly in favour of establishing the camps (in addition to other camps) as bona fide Aboriginal Communities they were, in the Council's view, rewarding the behaviour that it opposed. Its concern was that this would firmly establish social problems in these locations.
Response strategies were being negotiated through the Memorandum of Understanding, with the Katherine Town Council cautiously moving towards acceptance of a compromise that dealt with perceived social problems. Minutes of the KALA indicate this may have been a difficult process considering the differing views, the strength of the views and the weight of Katherine Combined Aboriginal Organisations' (KCAO) representatives.
In 1996 there was a Ministerial reshuffle in the NT Cabinet: Minister Hatton was demoted and the Member of the Legislative Assembly for Katherine, The Hon. Mike Reed, was appointed as the Minister responsible for Lands Planning and Environment (Peirce 1999). He had a different approach to the KALA working party. After a few further meetings the committee dissembled (Peirce 1999; . It was later replaced with the Katherine Antisocial Behaviour Committee which had no Aboriginal representation and much closer Ministerial control over the composition and proceedings (Peirce I in preference to a partisan dispersal j powerful ones. Such a position seems to 1999). Commitment to the Memorandum / of Understanding waned with the collapse of the KALA working party. The bipartisan approach to the issue of Aboriginal living areas in Katherine floundered.
Then in 1998, after the flood the camps were razed. Eviction had been seen as necessary because of the persistent behavioural problems and health concerns. A new 'drinking area' was established about 12 months later to bring the committee 'another step closer to solving the problems [that] were faced ... daily in [Katherine's] streets'.
Closing statements
Evidence indicates that the previous residents of Wallaby and Red Gum Camps still live in and around Katherine (Campbell 1999 , Peirce 1999 . Long term Katherine resident and Wardaman associate, Bill Harney, believes that since the 'clearance' one Wallaby Camp family was offered Housing Commission accommodation and was later evicted for allowing other family members to overcrowd the house (Harney 1999). Others are living near the creek, in the bush (Hamey 1999). The drinking area has failed to attract drinkers, and the problem behaviours that were evident in Katherine are still pressingly evident.
As a response to behavioural problems in the Katherine community it is clear the strategic actions were ineffective. The Katherine Combined Aboriginal Organisations (KCAO) component of the KALA working party accepted that problem behaviours existed in Katherine, but saw them as social problems which related to alcohol abuse and as such should be dealt with through 'Living With Alcohol' and such programs in the community They were not convinced that the campers were any more responsible for offensive behaviour than were other Katherine residents (Peirce 1999). Campbell has stated that the behavioural and camping issues are not associated and that the residents of these camps were not problematic drinkers (Campbell 1999) .
The residents were permanently moved away from Red Gum and Wallaby Camps without compensation or alternative arrangements. The government initially consulted widely, developed a planned and logical strategy at some cost and then without evaluating this strategy terminated its development strategy As there had been, at the time of writing, no official evaluation of the relative success of the dispersal strategy and no reestablishment of the KALA, then it must be assumed that the policy response was about non-Aboriginal control of Aboriginal behaviour.
The analysis so far indicates that the government felt the need to act in solving the problems that were faced daily by some constituents (the non-Aboriginal residents of Katherine) even though the action worsened the intended target (quality of life) problems of other constituents (the Aboriginal campers).
This 
A problem for policy
Simplistically there would appear in the Katherine case study to be policy approaches that (a) sought to help Aboriginal people deal with perceived living condition problems through consultative interventions, and (b)sought to control Aboriginal people and eliminate perceived problems that their behaviours created. These alternative approaches are favoured according to the dominating perception of who deserves to have their need attended to. These became competing rather than complementary positions.
In considering Aboriginal affairs policy since 1967 , Jennett (1990 considers that 'opposing interests occur at varying levels ...
[from] the racial divide ... [to] ... the richlpoor dichotomy' with the broader community representing their own interests as embodying the national interest. Clearly there is an informed perception that Aboriginal interests are commonly rejected and redefined in favour of broad community interests.
'The fact is that Aboriginal interests conflict with many more powerful ones and, when these are at issue, it is the Aboriginal interests which are generally compromised' (Jennett 1990) . The NT Government acted as an instrument of more-powerful interests dominating lessunderstate the initial effort put into the consultative approach to Aboriginal living conditions in Katherine. Thus the policies that have been developed in support of Aboriginal chosen lifestyles argue for a broader analysis.
In the Katherine case study the perceived causes of the problem are represented by two interest groups. The Wardaman view, representing the KCOA, was that there is insufficient appropriate accommodation for a growing and diverse Aboriginal population in the Katherine region (Peirce 1999). Behavioural issues were acknowledged, and were to be addressed as a symptom of inappropriate living conditions, and consequent social problems. This perspective was being incorporated into policy while Hatton was the responsible Minister. Hatton, however, also articulated an alternate view that he considered was pervasive in the broad (Katherine) community. This position held that Aboriginal people were flooding into the towns because of a desire to drink alcohol and break free of the strictures of tribal law (Hatton 1999). When in towns these people refused to adopt the expected mores of the broader community pertaining to habitation of appropriate housing, behaviour in public and standards of cleanliness (Hatton 1999) . Within this view are resident assumptions about accepted behaviour in towns, the options available to Aboriginal campers and who is responsible for the problem behaviours.
The Wardaman view and the Katherine residents' view of the problem differ in perceived levels of Aboriginal control over the Aboriginal living condition problem and in the perception of how much control they should be afforded in the policy response. The above perceptions of the problem shall be referred to as Problem Perception (1) 1999) . The situation of reduced choice that they experience requires some form of social correction. The preferred response therefore is a planned one dependent on the needs of the people and increasing their capacity to respond to these problems.
The alternate 'residents' Problem Perception (2) is that deliberate Aboriginal misbehaviour is creating the living condition problems. From this perspective they are not choosing to behave appropriately while in town, and are choosing to live in town so that they can behave in this way. Therefore, logically, the Aboriginal offenders should be controlled by the appropriate government agencies, such as local authorities, police, or welfare workers. From this perspective Aboriginal people have more than adequate choice and are deliberately picking the wrong choices. From a non-Aboriginal value base, they could be seen as abusing privileges that society had afforded them and so deserve a reduction in their choices.
Alternate understandings of the source of the above problem define radically different solutions. In the Katherine case study, the NT Government under Minister Hatton, seemed to be amenable to some of the Peirce agenda but cautious about the preponderance of Problem Perception (2) in the broader community. The task of appeasing both interest groups is difficult when they have conflicting interpretations of the problem and opposing positions for its solution. If more options were provided for Aboriginal people in Katherine, then proponents of Perception (2) would feel that Aboriginal people were being rewarded for bad behaviour. If a punitive approach were applied, Hatton was aware that the problem would persist. Thus he developed a consultative approach that required consensus among the representatives of the opposing interest groups and acceptance of the need for additional time and resources by the broad community.
Minister Reed is also the local Member of the Legislative Assembly for Katherine. He is much closer to any ill-will in the predominantly non-Aboriginal Katherine electorate. There is much for him to lose in making a policy decision that disaffects the non-Aboriginal population. The policy problem is then in reducing (Hatton 1995) . Certainly the living conditions themselves are significant enough issues to be presented in the public arena. There , is a considerable body of literature about government intervention into Town Camps (Memmott 1988 , 1991 , 1996 , Ross 1999 . Further there is , general acceptance that considerable action has been taken intervening i n Aboriginal living conditions in Australia, and Heppel a n d Memmott have documented government intervention into indigenous living conditions over
Historical background
many years (Heppell 1975 , Memmott 1988 , 1991 , 1996 .
It must be assumed that the significance of Aboriginal living conditions (and Hatton's actions) the housing agenda and developed ! have been numerated as positive or through the 1980s a statistical articulation of this housing deficit as a quantitative interpretation of Aboriginal living condition problems (Sanders 1990 ). An alternative agenda, based on a of an ethnocenhc imperative to improve the / deeper understanding of Aboriginal negative occurrences of each of the eight issue categories. In the absence of other systematic available information, this picture may be perceived to present to government a negative dominant , perception of these living conditions. The 1996). Memmott described how the image of the humpy became an image of deficiency against a European standard of desirable housing, or living conditions. The 'deficit approach' to Aboriginal housing of Aboriginal people (Memmott ' requirements, was eclipsed by more easily community and government are likely to expressed 'scientific' measurements (Sanders 1990 qualities of the shelter seemed to be less important than the above siting attributes.
In the Katherine study, the concern for Aboriginal living-condition requirements that was precipitated by Richardson was combined with behavioural issues that related to non-Aboriginal expectations of Aboriginal people in the town. This corresponds with the view that the interest of non-Aboriginal people tend to dominate the perception of Aboriginal requirements.
Similarly there has been on the part of government an expectation that Aboriginal people should live under conditions that align with the broad community's perception of appropriate living conditions. This has been manifest in defining the Aboriginal lifestyle needs of Aboriginal people as 'housing needs'. The long-standing agenda to improve 'appalling' living conditions of Aboriginal people has justified housing provision in settlements.
This accords with Jennett's view that the broader community represent their own interests as embodying the national interest (Jennett 1990) and that Aboriginal interests are compromised in the byplay. That which one person derides, another may prefer. This depends on how one perceives hisher interests. Thus the policy problem similarly may be perceived by some Aboriginal people as a desire to impose appalling conditions on them through housing policy. Under such conditions it is not likely to achieve success for all Aboriginal people.
Conclusion
This article identifies two alternate perceptions of the problem of Aboriginal living conditions i n the Northern Territory. The discussion has however been dominated by the negative perception of Aboriginal living conditions that are incorporated in paradigms that underpin both perspectives. The Problem Perception (1) held that Aboriginal living conditions were appalling and required further financial intervention, approaches can produce quite different policy outcomes. There is a clear need to locate Aboriginal housing within the far wider context of overall living conditions and to positively reconsider current approaches to Aboriginal life choices. . Logically most articles are from NT newspapers
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